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Faisal Kutty* 
One month after the State of Kansas passed Senate Bill 791 banning the 
use of foreign law; a Johnson City district court was faced with the 
consequences when Elahm Soleimani sought the enforcement of her Islamic 
marriage contract.2  Her contract with Farahmarz Soleimani stipulated a 
mahr3 payment of 1,354 gold coins, a value of $677,000 at the time, in the 
 
 *   Faisal Kutty is an assistant professor of law at Valparaiso University School of Law and an 
adjunct professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.  Prior to academia, he co-
founded the Toronto-based firm KSM Law and served as counsel to a coalition of national Muslim 
organizations during the faith-based arbitration controversy in Ontario from 2003 to 2005 when the 
Ontario government ostensibly “banned” Islamic arbitrations.  See Faisal Kutty, The Myth and 
Reality of “Shari’a Courts” in Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the Indigenization of Islamic 
Legal Rulings, 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 559, 559 (2010).  The author would like to acknowledge 
research assistance from Zahran Khan (J.D. candidate, Temple University Beasley School of Law) 
and Ali Chaudhry (J.D. candidate, Leicester University Law School).  He would also like to thank 
Sana Mirza and Shaikh Ahmad Kutty for their comments, suggestions, and encouragement.  The 
author remains indebted to them for their help, suggestions, and insights without which this project 
would have been left incomplete. 
 1.  S.B. 79, 84th Leg. (Kan. 2012) (enacted). 
 2.  Rafia Zakaria, Sharia Law Ban and Muslim Wives, AL JAZEERA, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201321174724878286.html (last modified Feb. 
16, 2013, 15:18). 
 3.  Mahr is a provision of a nuptial contract negotiation by most Muslims who marry according 
to Islamic custom, both abroad and domestically.   Richard Freeland, The Islamic Institution of Mahr 
and American Law, 4 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 2, 2 (2001).   Generally, it is considered the husband’s 
payment of money to the wife, which can be a small token sum of one dollar or millions of dollars.  
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event of divorce.4  From the facts, it appears that Farahmarz was more than 
happy to agree to the mahr amount at the time of the marriage given that it 
was his second marriage and she was twenty-four years his junior.5   
While introducing the bill for a vote on July 1, 2012, State Senator 
Susan Wagle told the Kansas Legislature that it was “a vote to protect 
women,”6 confirming the suspicions of many that it was specifically 
designed to target “Sharī’ah” law.7  Elham would beg to disagree with the 
 
Id.  The property received is the legal property of the wife, so it is not a “bride price.”  Id.  Many 
times, there is a portion that is deferred and a portion that comes due immediately.  Id.  
 4.  Zakaria, supra note 2.  See In re Marriage of Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 Ch. 23, 
Div. 7 (Dist. Ct. of Johnson Cnty., Kan. Civ. Ct. Dep’t Aug. 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf. 
 5.  Zakaria, supra note 2.  In traditional Muslim societies the mahr served as a form of security 
for women from being divorced or constructively divorced.  See id. 
 6.  Zakaria, supra note 2.  “This [bill] doesn’t say ‘Sharia law,’” Republican State Senator Chris 
Steineger said in a speech that condemned the legislation for discriminating against Muslims, “but 
that’s how it was marketed back in January and all session long—and I have all the e-mails to prove 
it.”  Abed Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, THE NATION (July 13, 2012), 
http://thenation.com/article/168378/true-story-sharia-american-courts#.  
 7.  I use Sharī’ah because anti-Islamic law activists have been using it.  Faiza Patel, Matthew 
Duss & Amos Toh, Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties and Practical Problems, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS 1 (May 2013), available at http://americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
ForeignLawBans.pdf.  They are referred throughout as anti-Sharī’ah activists. Some writers also 
inaccurately use Sharī’ah and Islamic law interchangeably.  See id. at 5.  There is also confusion and 
conflation of the terms Sharī’ah and Fiqh.  Id.  The most accurate characterization of what some 
people object to are certain Fiqh positions, views or rulings (loosely subsumed under Islamic law).  
See id. (explaining that if people are objecting to the “processes of Islamic legal reasoning or the 
rulings produced through it,” they are referring to the term fiqh. Sharī’ah encompasses the broad and 
overarching principles and methodologies, while fiqh is used to refer to the body of derivative rules 
formulated by jurists.  Id.  Fiqh and Islamic law may be closer in terms of meaning but the two may 
also be different depending on context and use.  See id. (highlighting the slight difference in meaning 
between fiqh and Sharī’ah).  Muhammad Asad, the prominent Islamic thinker, narrows down the 
Sharī’ah to the nusus, the definitive ordinances of the Qur’ān which are expounded in positive legal 
terms.  See M. H. Kamali, Source, Nature and Objectives of Shari’ah, 33 ISLAMIC Q. 211, 233 
(1989).  “Islamic law is far broader and includes those rules and laws that have been derived using 
sources and methodologies for deriving laws sanctioned by Islamic jurisprudence, as well as all the 
quasi-Islamic laws in existence in Muslim countries as a result of colonization and secularization.”  
Id.  Islamic law encompasses fiqh (from pre-modern times to contemporary times) as well as the 
state sanctioned derivatives and laws.  See id.  In other words, Islamic law can refer to the following: 
(1) classical/medieval/pre-modern iterations of fiqh; (2) the laws in some Muslim nations which are 
more accurately an amalgam of common law and/or civil law and manifestations and derivatives of 
classical fiqh and modern fiqh; (3) it can refer to the modified classical (traditionalist) fiqh that we 
find Muslims practicing to varying degrees in contemporary times without any governmental or state 
oversight or direct interference; (4) it can also refer to diverse salafi/modernist/islamist/progressive, 
etc. iterations of fiqh (and combinations and permutations thereof), which operate similarly to 
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Senator, her self-proclaimed and self-appointed savior.  The court refused to 
enforce Elham’s request citing various reasons, the most significant for our 
purposes being “the religious nature of the [contract].”8  In its August 28, 
2012 ruling, the court concluded that “enforcing the agreement . . . would 
abdicate the judiciary’s role to protect such fundamental rights [ostensibly 
women’s’ rights), a concern that was articulated in Senate Bill No. 79.”9   
Essentially the court took the position that enforcing the Islamic contract 
would violate the foreign law ban and the “separation of Church and State 
[doctrine] under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment” of the 
U.S. Constitution.10 
This contrasts with a decision the same month in New York in SB v. 
WA, where a Muslim-American woman who was married to an Egyptian 
man successfully enforced her mahr of $250,000.11  The court upheld the 
contract even though it was religious in nature and notwithstanding the fact 
that the actual divorce took place in the United Arab Emirates.12 
Now rewind back to 1998.  That year in another mahr case brought in 
the State of Massachusetts, Rima Nahavandi sought a court order compelling 
her husband Ahmad to grant her mahr as part of the divorce proceedings.13  
Judge Alexander Waugh wrote: “[T]he agreement should be enforced in an 
appropriate Islamic tribunal.”14  He identified the threshold questions as: 
whether the contract was “a purely secular one governed by [the precedent 
of] ‘neutral principles,’” or was it “so inextricably intertwined with the 
tenets of the Islamic faith that it cannot be enforced in this Court?”15  Judge 
Waugh concluded the latter and refused to order Ahmad Nahavandi to pay 
 
number three.  See id. (explaining that Islamic law has a broad definition).  For a good visual 
representation of the main concepts see Faisal Kutty & Ahmad Kutty, The Kutty Islamic Law 
Flowchart, available at http://faisalkutty.com/islamic-law/flowchart/. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Zakaria, supra note 2. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id.; S.B. v. W.A., No. 51875(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 2012) (Justicia), available at 
https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2012/2012-ny-slip-op-51875-u.html.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Sylvia Whitman, Whose Place to Decide? Islamic Family Law Issues in American 
Courtrooms, Presented at the Ass’n of Muslim Social Scientists’ 34th Annual Conference: Muslims 
and Islam in the Chaotic Modern World: Relations Among Themselves and with Others (Sept. 30–
Oct. 2, 2005) (on file with author) (citing Nahavandi v. Nahavandi, No. FM-12-2237-97, (N.J. Ch.)).  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
[Vol. 41: 1059, 2014] “Islamic Law” in US Courts 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1062 
the $20,000 mahr stipulated in the Islamic marriage contract.16  The judge 
did state though that if the wife, Rima, was to get a favorable decision from 
an Islamic tribunal or Imam, then she could have it enforced through the 
courts.17   
Before and since the many foreign law/Sharī’ah law ban proposals, 
various courts in diverse North American jurisdictions have taken different 
positions on such religious questions and proposed different solutions.18   
This ground reality of case-by-case decision-making—as disjointed as it is—
challenges the view advocated by proponents of the Sharī’ah law/foreign 
law ban that “Islamic law” is overtaking American law.19  Their calls to ban 
foreign law/ Sharī’ah law demonstrate a lack of understanding of the 
nuances and sophistication of both American law and of course Islamic 
law.20   
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See Jay M. Zitter, Application, Recognition, or Consideration of Islamic Law by Courts in 
United States, 82 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2013); see also Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: 
A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 
177, 177–229 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004); see also JULIE MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE IN 
NORTH AMERICA: A SHARI’A PATH IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
 19.  The foreign law ban movement, which morphed into the “American law for American 
courts” movement, started out as a “ban Sharī’ah law” movement.  “Although packaged as an effort 
to protect American values and democracy, the bans spring from a movement whose goal is the 
demonization of the Islamic faith . . . .  The most vociferous proponents of foreign law bans are a 
small network of activists who cast Muslim norms and culture, which they collectively and 
inaccurately labeled as Sharia law, as one of the greatest threats to American freedom since the Cold 
War.”  Patel, supra note 7; see also Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/ 
31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing the Anti- Sharī’ah law movement as an 
“orchestrated drive” begun by David Yerushalmi, “a 56-year-old Hasidic Jew with a history of 
controversial statements about race, immigration, and Islam); Wajahat Ali, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, 
Scott Keyes & Faiz Shakir, Fear Inc: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, (Aug. 2011) 2, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/ 
islamophobia.pdf.  The recasting as a foreign law/international law ban came after the Oklahoma 
save the state referendum banning the use of Islamic law in state courts was deemed 
unconstitutional.  See Awad v. Ziriax, 670, F.3d 1111, 1129–1131 (10th Cir. 2012).  See also Omar 
Sacirbey, Anti-Shariah movement changes tactics and gains success, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (May 
16 2013), http://www.religionnews.com/2013/05/16/anti-shariah-movement-changes-tactics-and-
gains-success/.  
 20.  In popular usage, this term raised the specter of stoning women, capital punishment, and 
other such fears.  See Sherman A. Jackson, What is Shariah and Why Does it Matter?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 11, 2010, 8:16 PM), http:/www.huffingtonpost.com/sherman-a.jackson/what-is-sharia-
andwhy-d_b_710976.html.  A significant contributing factor to this fear is the Sharī’ah-based laws 
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Such cases highlight the tension inherent when courts engage with 
religion per se, but in particular Islam and Muslims in the present 
Islamaphobic climate.21  There has always been an uneasy relationship 
 
and practices in certain Muslim countries.  Arguments in defense of Islam or Islamic jurisprudence 
became unwinnable no matter how nuanced or qualified once the term Sharī’ah was associated with 
the issue.  As Tariq Modood accurately noted in the British context: “Part of the problem is 
language.  The mere fact of saying something positive about ‘sharia’ leads to knee-jerk hostility 
amongst many people, just as the term ‘secularism’ regrettably is understood [by some] Muslims as 
a policy of atheism, colonialism or postcolonial despotism.  The use of either of these terms can lead 
to the closing of minds, however reasonable and qualified what is being said.”  Tariq Modood, 
Multicultural Citizenship and the Anti-Sharia Storm, OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 14, 2008), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/faith_ideas/europe_islam/anti_sharia_storm.  For a detailed 
discussion of Islamic law sources, methodology, diversity and potential for evolution see Faisal 
Kutty, The Myth and Reality of ‘Shari’a Courts’ in Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the 
Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 577–595 (2010).  Despite the 
nuance—complexity, diversity and changeability in Islamic jurisprudence—opponents have seized 
on a fundamentally flawed understanding of “Sharia law.”  As explained in a recent report issued by 
the Center for American Progress, the “‘Sharia threat’ argument is based on an extreme type of 
scripturalism where one pulls out verses from a sacred text and argues that believers will behave 
according to that text.”  Wajahat Ali & Matthew Duss, Understanding Sharia Law: Conservatives’ 
Skewed Interpretation Needs Debunking, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (March 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/pdf/sharia_law.pdf.  But “[t]here is no one thing 
called Sharia.”  Id.  Rather, “[a] variety of Muslim communities exist, and each understands Sharia 
in its own way.”  Id.  Thus, attributing particular beliefs and activities to all Muslims based on the 
Quran or other religious writings would be akin to declaring, based on the Bible, that all “Jews stone 
disobedient sons to death (Deut. 21:18-21) or that Christians slay all non-Christians (Luke 19:27).”  
Id.  Moreover, because Sharia “is overwhelmingly concerned with personal religious observance 
such as prayer and fasting, and not with national laws,” characterizing it as a threat to our courts or 
country “is the same thing as [saying that] all observant Muslims are a threat,” as “[i]t is [impossible 
to] find a Muslim who practices any ritual and does not believe himself or herself to be complying 
with Sharia.”  Id.  These fine details fall on deaf ears when hysteria, fear, and emotions take over.   
 21.  Id.; see also NATHAN LEAN, THE ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY: HOW THE RIGHT 
MANUFACTURES FEAR OF MUSLIMS (2012); Haroon Siddiqui, Islamophobia: The new anti-
Semitism, TORONTO STAR (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2011/09/16/ 
islamaphobia_the_new_antisemitism.html; Daniel Luban, The New Anti-Semitism, TABLET (Aug. 
19, 2010), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/43069/the-new-anti-semitism-2; 
Commission on British Muslims, RUNNYMEDE, www.runnymedetrust.org/projects-and-
publications/projects/past-projects/commissionOnBritishMuslims.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); 
Highlights of EUMC Report Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, 
E.U. AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Dec. 2006),  
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2006/highlights-eumc-report-muslims-european-union-
discrimination-and-islamaphobia; Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum Combating 
Intolerance (Jan. 30, 2001), available at http://www.fasena.de/download/rechts/SIFCI.pdf; Mark 
Potok, FBI: Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Still Up, SALON (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/12/10/fbi_anti_muslim_hate_crimes_still_up/; Mark Potok, The 
‘Patriot’ Movement Explodes, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/spring/the-year-in-hate-and-extremism (last 
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between religion and law.  Since the Enlightenment, secular and religious 
elites have been constantly negotiating and renegotiating their respective 
spheres of influence and power. In much of the western world, the dominant 
discourse and practice became one of strict separation of church and state.22 
From this marginalization and premature pronouncement of its demise, 
religion has come back from the dead to reclaim an even greater role in the 
new world.23  As globalization ramps up and nation-states become more 
multi-religious, modern liberal democracies are witnessing even more 
complex tensions between law and religion.  This has obviously resulted in 
more legislation, disputes and of course increased litigation.  The US is of 
course no exception.  As recently as the 1960’s and 1970’s religion had 
relatively little place in the current system, but now “the current 
system…embraces religion as an important source and dimension of law, 
politics and society.”24  
This paper argues that in a nation with a constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of religion, and which respects the notions of freedom of contract 
and legal pluralism, religion must not be excluded outright from the calculus 
of court decisions if we are to ensure equal treatment and access to justice in 
a multi-religious society.  Contrary to those who argue that America is 
experiencing creeping Sharī’ah and that courts have caved in to judicial 
jihad, this paper posits that courts have simply carried out their 
constitutional imperative of equal treatment and religious freedom for all 
within the parameters of the Constitution, principles of comity, freedom of 
contract, and federal and state public policy goals.  Part I introduces the 
issue with a macro overview of first amendment jurisprudence.  Part II 
reviews how U.S. courts have treated cases involving contracts, arbitrations, 
 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 22.  DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY (2003).  In contrast, in much of 
the Islamic world there was no theoretical separation of the two but in practice the state and the 
ulama (jurists and scholars) had their mutually understood spheres of influence and control at least 
in the Sunni context.  See, e.g., LEON CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH 
TO POLITICS 1–5 (2000). 
 23.  See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, The Tea Party’s Religious Inspiration, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/02/the-tea-partys-religious-inspiration/7167 
9/; Jonathan Merritt, The Rise of the Christian Left in America, ATLANTIC (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/the-rise-of-the-christian-left-in-america/ 
278086/.  
 24.  John Witte, The Study of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report, 14 
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 327, 329–330. 
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defenses, and other personal law matters brought by Muslims or that address 
the Islamic faith.  Part II also situates this debate through the prism of the 
right to contract, the principle of comity and public policy. Part III presents 
the argument that, given the essentially multicultural and legal pluralistic 
nature of American society, constitutional rights to religious freedom and 
freedom of contract will only have any real value when religious 
communities, including Muslims, are guaranteed some level of autonomy 
and access to justice both within and outside US courthouses.  Part V 
concludes that far from succumbing to the Sharī’ah bogeyman and an 
imaginary judicial jihad, defending religious freedoms and equal treatment 
is the only way to remain true to the founding constitutional principles of 
this great country. 
I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGION IN U.S. COURTS  
Religious tribunals, religious schools and vouchers, religious symbols, 
the pledge of allegiance, religion and discrimination laws, religious liberty, 
personal law and status issues, contracts, and inheritance, among others, are 
some of the catalysts that engage law and religion.  To appreciate the tension 
inherent in these issues, we must first explore the evolving understanding of 
the First Amendment in American history.  Indeed, the First Amendment’s 
protection of religious freedom is one of the most celebrated aspects of the 
American liberal tradition.25  Many have argued that this is achieved through 
a wall of separation.26  The most acclaimed champion of the notion of a wall 
of separation between church and state is America’s founder Thomas 
Jefferson.27  In a series of tracts, he argued that true religious liberty can only 
 
 25.  See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869, 
1869-1905 (2003). 
 26.  See, e.g., id. 
 27.  See Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Metaphor: Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of Separation 
Between Church & State,” 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 123, 132 (2010).  Though some 
argue that the separation of church and state has no historical foundation in the First Amendment, 
Philip Hamburger argues that the detailed evidence shows that eighteenth-century Americans almost 
never invoked this principle.   PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 19 (2002).  
Although Thomas Jefferson and others retrospectively claimed that the First Amendment separated 
church and state, Hamburger argues that separation became part of American constitutional law only 
much later.  Id.  Others suggest that: “The First Amendment did not conceive religious freedom; 
rather, it adopted and incorporated the widely-recognized natural and inalienable right of each 
person to worship God according to his or her own conviction and conscience.”  See E. Gregory 
Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 485, 488 
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be attained by privatizing religion and secularizing politics.28  He further 
argued that religious privatization is the bargain that must be struck to 
contain religious bigotry and ensure religious freedom for all.29  Jefferson, it 
is argued, read this understanding of religious liberty into the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .”30     
Without wading into the detailed legislative and judicial histories, this 
view of the Establishment Clause, though initially dismissed as too radical, 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of 
Education of Ewing Twp.31  Justice Hugo writing for the majority noted: “In 
the words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion by 
law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and 
State.’”32  Then in 1971, the Supreme Court established a three-part test for 
First Amendment Establishment Clause challenges in Lemon v. Kurtzman.33  
First, the law must have a secular purpose.34  Second, the primary effect of 
the law must not be to advance nor hinder religion.35  Third, the law must not 
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.36  All three prongs 
must be satisfied to pass constitutional muster.37  As John Witte notes: “This 
constitutional reification of Jeffersonian logic rendered the establishment 
clause a formidable obstacle to many traditional forms of state patronage of 
 
(2009).  
 28.  See Hamburger, supra note 27; see also DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND 
THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002).  There are also those who argue 
that Jefferson has been misread.  See THOMAS S. KIDD, GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2010); see also Patrick M. Garry, The Myth of Separation: America’s 
Historical Experience with Church and State, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 475, 494–95 (2004).  
 29.  See Hamburger, supra note 27, at 19. 
 30.  U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.  Notwithstanding this view, there is now much scholarship arguing 
that Jefferson demanded a firm separation of church and state but never sought a wholly secular 
public square.  See, e.g., JOHN RAGOSTA, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:  JEFFERSON’S LEGACY, AMERICA’S 
CREED (2003).  
 31. 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). 
 32.  Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 (1947). 
 33.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971) 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 613. 
 37.  Id. at 612. 
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and co-operation with religion.”38 
With respect to the accompanying Free Exercise provision, fast 
forwarding to the contemporary era, the Supreme Court under Earl Warren 
adopted an expansive view.39  The Court required that states have a 
“compelling interest” in refusing to accommodate religiously motivated 
conduct in Sherbert v. Verner.40  The case involved Adele Sherbert, who was 
denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to 
work on Saturdays, something forbidden by her Seventh-day Adventist 
faith.41 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court ruled that a law that “unduly 
burdens the free exercise of religion” without a compelling interest, even 
though it might be “neutral on its face,” would be unconstitutional.42  The 
“compelling interest” doctrine became much narrower in 1990, when the 
Supreme Court held in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith that as long as a law does not target a 
particular religious practice, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.43  
In 1993, the Supreme Court revisited the Free Exercise Clause in Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.44  Hialeah had passed an 
ordinance banning ritual slaughter, a practice central to the Santería religion, 
while providing exceptions for some practices such as the kosher slaughter 
of Judaism. Since the ordinance was not “generally applicable,” the Court 
ruled that it was subject to the compelling interest test, which it failed to 
meet, and was therefore declared unconstitutional.45 
Defenders of the Free Exercise Clause argue that it is as a cornerstone of 
 
 38.  John Witte, The Study of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report, 14 
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 327, 338 (2012). 
 39.  See Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the 
Establishment Clause, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 77 (2007); Joseph A. Ignagni, U.S. Supreme Court 
Decision-Making and the Free Exercise Clause, 55 REV. POL. 511, 511–29 (1993). 
 40.  374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 41.  Id. at 399. 
 42.  406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
 43.  494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990). 
 44.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 45.  Id. at 531.  Also in 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 
which sought to restore the “compelling interest” standard.  In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) the 
Court struck down the provisions of the Act that forced state and local governments to provide 
protections exceeding those required by the First Amendment, which the courts enjoy sole power to 
interpret.  According to the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, RFRA remains applicable to federal statutes, which must therefore still meet the 
“compelling interest” standard in free exercise cases.  546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006). 
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American history and liberty, while critics argue that it grants a privileged 
and undeserved legal status to increasingly irrelevant religious 
communities.46  Courts in Canada and much of Europe have frequently 
turned to proportionality analysis to determine what provisions ought to be 
allowed for individuals’ religious liberty.47  In contrast, in the United States, 
courts have historically attempted to leave such decisions to legislators.  
This clearly goes against the argument of those advocating for a ban on 
Sharī’ah law that the courts have been giving in to Sharī’ah.   
Recent examples of these tensions in the United States include a wide 
range of conflicts, including a proposed circumcision ban in San Francisco,48 
the foreign law/Sharī’ah law bans,49 and state laws prohibiting religiously-
motivated business owners from denying services for same-sex weddings.50  
Indeed, even the apex court of the nation has itself been called upon to 
address recent skirmishes between law and religion, issuing decisions in 
both Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC51 and CLS v. Martinez52 that consider conflicts between anti-
discrimination norms and religious liberty.  In November 2013, the Court 
also heard arguments in Town of Greece v. Galloway,53 where the Court was 
asked to determine whether a New York town’s practice of having prayer 
before town board meetings violates the establishment clause.54   
At the end of 2013, the Court agreed to weigh in on the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act55 (ACA) requirement that employers 
 
 46.  See Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The 
Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1083–1120 (2008); see also 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Curious Chiasma: Rising and Falling Protection of Religious 
Freedom and Gender Equality, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 394 (2002). 
 47.  T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT’L 
L.  REV. LAW 465, 466 (2005).  
 48.  Madison Park, San Francisco judge removes circumcision ban from ballot, CNN (July 28, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/28/circumcision.ban.voting/. 
 49.  State Legislation Restricting Use of Foreign or Religious Law, PEWRESEARCH: RELIGION 
AND PUBLIC LIFE PROJECT (April 8, 2013), http://features.pewforum.org/sharia-law-map/.  
 50.  See, e.g.,  Initial Decision Granting Complainant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Craig v. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Admin. Ct. Dec. 6, 2013), available at  
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_no._cr_2013-0008.pdf. 
 51.  132 S. Ct. 694. (2012).  
 52.  130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  
 53.  681 F. 3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 54.  Id. at 22. 
 55.  OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL, 111TH CONG. COMPILATION OF PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
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provide contraceptive coverage to their employees irrespective of the 
employers’ religious objections.  The Court has agreed to hear an appeal 
from the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which sided with Hobby 
Lobby, an Oklahoma-based chain of craft stores owned by a Christian 
family who claimed that providing such coverage would violate the 
company’s religious freedom.56  At the same time it will hear a related 
appeal from the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which denied that 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. had the same religious conscience rights 
as an individual.57  Earlier this year, the court also granted a temporary 
injunction temporarily baring the Obama administration from enforcing the 
Health and Human Services contraceptive mandate under the ACA against 
Little Sisters of the Poor.58 
A review of case law reveals that people of all faiths have used their 
right to seek relief through the courts when they believe their religious 
freedom is restricted.59  Indeed, courts throughout America have been called 
upon to adjudicate assertions of religious freedom in a variety of contexts 
and faiths where religious beliefs and practices conflict with state law..60  
This should not cause any concerns provided that courts do not become 
improperly entangled with religion.  Anti-Sharī’ah advocates point to Allah 
v. Adella Jordan-Luster,61 as an example of wading improperly into 
religion.62  Shaheed’s claim that the prison violated his free exercise rights 
by not ensuring that all the meat served to him was prepared in accordance 
with his Islamic beliefs was rejected by the court.63  Contrary to what anti-
Sharī’ah advocates claim, rather than caving in to this instance of “Judicial 
 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010), available at http://housedocs.house.gov/energycommerce/ 
ppacacon.pdf (Sandra L. Strokoff & Edward G. Grossman).  
 56.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 678 (2013). 
 57.  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 58.  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2013).. As of 
February 13, 2014, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty documents  ninety-three  challenges to the 
ACA HHS contraceptive mandate.  Legal Challenges to the HHS Mandate, THE BECKETT FUND FOR 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last viewed Feb. 13, 2014). 
 59.  See Patel, supra note 7, at 1. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  No. 04-1083, 2007 WL 2582199 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2007). 
 62.  Spearit, Religion as Rehabilitation? Reflections on Islam in the Correctional Setting, 34 
WHITTIER L. REV. 29, 42 (2012). 
 63.  Allah, 2007 WL 2582199, at *10. 
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Jihad,” the court ruled against the Muslim inmate and held that the prison’s 
practice of serving pork-free meals was sufficient accommodation.64   
Anti-Sharī’ah advocates appear to have a problem with someone even 
raising Islam in court, while apparently not having any issues with other 
groups raising similar arguments.65  Many of them appear to blame Muslims 
for what they see as increasing porousness of the wall of separation.66  The 
wall of separation is clearly not as solid or as impermeable as once thought, 
but for reasons other than those advanced by anti-Sharī’ah advocates—
Islam and Muslims.67  This shift has been taken place not because of foreign 
law and certainly not due to any takeover by Sharī’ah advocates. 68  It has 
simply been a response to the demands from American society.69  Religious 
scholar John Witte, for instance, writes: 
Over the past 30 years, the Supreme Court has been quietly defying 
its earlier separationist logic and has reversed some of its harshest 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Courts have recognized that, “[u]nder both the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA in its most 
elemental form, a prisoner has a ‘clearly established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . . 
religious scruples[.]’ . . .  A prison official violates this clearly established right if he intentionally 
and without sufficient justification denies an inmate his religiously mandated diet.” Lovelace v. Lee, 
472 F.3d 174, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2006) (granting Muslim inmate’s request for Ramadan meal). In fact, 
inmates of diverse faiths routinely request religious diets.  Courts grant or deny such requests taking 
into consideration a number of factors, including the nature of the inmate’s claimed religious beliefs, 
the sincerity of such beliefs, and the institutional justification, if any, for refusing the request.  See, 
e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir.2009) (finding that denying a non-meat diet during 
Lent and on Fridays substantially burdened the religious practice of a Roman Catholic prisoner); 
See, e.g., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that federal prison was required 
to provide Orthodox Jewish inmate with kosher meals consistent with his religious beliefs); See, e.g., 
Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (ordering religious diet requested by inmate follower 
of Thelema – a magic-based faith). 
 66.  See John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 
499 (2004) for a discussion of the break down of the wall of separation of church and state. 
 67.  JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE, VOL. 1: THE 
ODYSSEY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (2004); John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of 
Religion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 513 (2004) (suggesting that recent cases indicate a shift toward 
freedom of public religion); Steven D. Smith, How Secularists Helped Knock Down the Wall of 
Separation between Church and State, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 8, 2007), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028602 (explaining the dissolution of the wall separating church and 
state).  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See, e.g., Separation of Church and State, BOISI CTR. PAPERS ON RELIGION IN THE U.S., 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/bc_papers/BCP-ChurchState.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2014).  
[Vol. 41: 1059, 2014] “Islamic Law” in US Courts 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1071 
separationist precedents…The Court has defended these more 
recent holdings on wide-ranging constitutional grounds; among 
other arguments, as a proper accommodation of religion under the 
establishment clause; as a necessary protection of religion under the 
free speech or free exercise clauses; and a simple application of the 
equal protection clause.  Collectively, these cases have shifted the 
centre of gravity of the First Amendment religion clauses from 
separationism and secularization to equal treatment of public and 
private religious expression.”70 
The evidence clearly reveals that this is not the fault of Muslims or 
Islamic law.71  Indeed, as a report by the Brennan Center concluded: “When 
adjudicated within the guidelines of the First Amendment, cases involving 
Muslims’ right to free exercise no more threaten the imposition of Sharia 
law than, for example, cases involving the rights of Christians pose a 
‘Biblical threat’ to our courts.”72 
II.  CASES INVOKING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, COMITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Disputes involving religion in different manifestations and at various 
levels set these competing interests into stark contrast and pose complex 
questions to secular judges.  In addition to religious liberty cases, in a 
growing number of cases, the courts as ultimate arbiters of law are called 
upon to resolve tensions and determine rights and responsibilities pursuant 
to certain religious arrangements and settlements.73  These have included 
cases involving arbitrations, contracts, business disputes, family and other 
personal law matters and even cases where defenses rely on manifestations 
of Muslim culture and different interpretations of Islam are raised.74  
 
 70.  Witte, supra note 24, at 339–40.   
 71.  See Patel, supra note 7, at 1. 
 72.  ACLU PROGRAM ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, NOTHING TO FEAR: DEBUNKING 
THE MYTHICAL “SHARIA THREAT” TO OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1 (May 2011), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_Report_FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf.  
 73.  See, e.g., Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 74.  There is of course no monolithic Muslim culture or one single understanding of Islam.  In 
fact, Islamic law and culture is deeply contested, interpreted and practiced in a multitude of ways.  
See, e.g., Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Sharia and Diversity: Why Some Americans are Missing the Point 
INST. FOR SOC. POL’Y & UNDERSTANDING (JAN. 2013), 
http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Report_ShariaDiversity_Final_web.pdf; see also Kutty, supra note 
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Addressing these issues demands a consideration not only of how to weigh 
the competing interests addressed in Part I, but also of the extent to which 
secular authorities should assess religious obligations.75  As the Brennan 
Center report notes: 
“The anti-Sharia movement also distorts how U.S. Courts treat 
Sharia and other religious codes such as Catholic canon law and 
Jewish law.   Many persons of faith—including Muslims, Jews, and 
Catholics—arrange their everyday lives according to religious laws 
and customs.”76   
 
American courts have traditionally recognized their ability to consider 
such cases provided that they are able to adjudicate them using neutral 
principles of law.77  These types of cases also engage the notion of freedom 
of contract, the principle of comity and public policy.78  Though not 
necessarily distinct or mutually exclusive at all times, each of these have a 
long track record in the American legal tradition and I would argue have 
served the nation well. 
There is a well-known common law tradition of freedom of contract 
which has entrenched itself in the American psyche.79  The idea of freedom 
of contract has always elicited heated debate among scholars and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has tackled and addressed the issue under the contract clause 
in Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause.80  Without getting into the technical details, the liberty of 
contract doctrine survives but with significant powers enjoyed by the state to 
 
20, at 558–97. 
 75.  See Patel, supra note 7, at 5.  
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).  Courts can enforce agreements that are 
drafted with religious principles provided that they meet the requirements of secular law.  Id. 
 78.  These are not necessarily mutually exclusive and are not always distinctly engaged. 
 79.  See, e.g., F. H. BUCKLEY, THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Duke Univ. 
Press, 1999); P. S. ATIYA, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, (Oxford Univ. Press. 
1979); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, Freedom of Contracts (Columbia Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 458, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325254 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2325254.  
 80.  See generally DAVID. E. BERNSTEIN, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (2008) available at 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/0851%20Freedom%20of%20Con
tract.pdf.  
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restrict this right.81    
This raises the question: can we support the idea that the state has the 
right to interfere in how citizens might decide, by mutual consent, to 
peacefully settle their private disputes and disagreements?  This of course 
goes against the liberal democratic notion of individual freedom and the 
latitude to make decisions about one’s own life.  The issue of arbitrations 
and Islamic contracts—family or business—is really one of freedom of 
contract.82    
Obviously it would be discriminatory to prohibit courts from 
entertaining such matters merely because Islam was involved without 
evaluating the merits and substance against long established American 
judicial practice and legal precedent.  This is precisely what many anti- 
Sharī’ah advocates are proposing.83  A June 2011 report published by a 
right-wing center founded by anti-Muslim activist Frank Gaffney stated that 
“Shariah law has entered into state court decisions, in conflict with the 
Constitution and state public policy.”84  The group’s general counsel 
happens to be none other than the man behind the Sharī’ah ban campaign, 
David Yerushalmi.85  The report also claims that there were 150 cases 
invoking what it inaccurately calls Sharī’ah law in state courts in 23 states.86  
The report also compiled a list of the “Top 20” cases where judges 
purportedly deferred to Sharī’ah law.87   
 
 81.  Id.  Two caveats are in order with respect to this.  See id.  First, these cases involved 
business and commercial enterprise.  Second, the case law does not negate the idea of freedom of 
contract but simply provides that the right may be restricted by the state in its attempts to prevent 
injury or advance its public policy goals. 
 82.  See Patel, supra note 7, at 23–24.  Arguably with more scrutiny and checks and balances in 
the family context necessary given the greater potential for inter alia abuse, exploitation, coercion, 
unequal bargaining power and social pressure.  See id. at 25–27.  
 83.  See id. at 5–8.  
 84.  CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES 8 (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2012/08/30/shariah-law-and-american-state-courts/.  See also 
Intelligence Files Profiles: Frank Gaffney, Jr., S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-files/profiles/frank-gaffney-jr. (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); see also Issues: 
Shariah Law, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/issues-2/shariah-law/ (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2014).  
 85.  Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 86.  CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 84, at 10–11.  
 87.  Id. at 29–42. 
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One of the cases put forth as evidence of the Sharī’ah onslaught is a 
business partnership dispute arbitration, Abd Alla v. Mourssi.88  Far from 
being part of a stealth Sharī’ah invasion, the court merely upheld an 
arbitration award because there was no evidence that the award “was [the] 
result of fraud, corruption, or other undue means.”89  The court also held that 
the defendant had run out of time to challenge the tribunal decision.90   
Alternative dispute resolution is an option that any American can resort 
to.91  Arbitration is one of these alternatives.92  It is one of myriad ways 
through which people can resolve their disputes.93  The process is based on 
contract law within the parameters of Constitution, public policy, and 
arbitration laws.94  Within these parameters parties have significant amount 
of freedom in its design and in crafting their terms of reference.95  For 
instance, parties have full rights to choose what rules will govern the 
resolution of the dispute—be it religious, secular, the law of other 
jurisdictions (subject to choice of law and conflict of law rules), or any other 
mutually agreed upon rules.96  While a party cannot unilaterally withdraw 
from the process after agreeing to arbitration, the process can be altered or 
terminated if both parties consent.97  As with any contractual arrangement, 
courts can stay a pending action while the matter is being arbitrated.98  
Courts can also be called upon to enforce arbitral decisions and will do so 
provided that they are not contrary to public policy, discriminatory, totally 
irrational, or unconscionable.99 
 
 88.  680 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Katherine V.W. Stone, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in Encyclopedia of Legal History 
(Stan Katz, ed., Oxford Univ. Press), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=631346., 
 92.  Joseph L. Daly, Arbitration: The Basics, 5 J. Am. Arb. 1 (2006). 
 93.  Jerome T. Barrett & Joseph P. Barrett, A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution: The 
Story of a Political, Cultural, and Social Movement (2004) 
 94.  Daly, supra note 92, at 1.  
 95.  Id. at 14–16. 
 96.  See id. at 16; see also Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New 
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231, 1243–44 (2011)  
(discussing that United States courts will enforce religious arbitration awards). 
 97.  See, e.g., Wein v. Morris, 909 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (quoting 
McKeeby v. Arthur, 81 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1951)) (“exercise of jurisdiction as arises out of the 
agreement to arbitrate may be lifted by the consent or waiver of the parties.”). 
 98.  Daly, supra note 92, at 16, n.63. 
 99.  See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial 
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As with almost all dispute resolution methods, arbitration must be 
jointly and voluntarily chosen by the parties to the dispute and cannot be 
imposed against their will.100  The only mandatory dispute resolution option 
is the court system; a party filing a claim or bringing an action or application 
through the courts can compel the other party to respond.101  Even in cases 
that proceed through the courts, the initiating party must take the first step 
by filing a claim or otherwise bringing the matter to a court.102  Generally, an 
affected party is under no obligation to enforce his rights, whether it be 
through the courts or otherwise.103 
The fear mongering with respect to Islamic arbitration is all the more 
hypocritical and discriminatory when one considers that various other 
communities have been arbitrating without outrage or objection.104  Such a 
blanket opposition is clearly against long established American ideals of 
freedom of contract, other contract law principles, and encouraging people 
to resolve disputes outside the courts, while providing access to the courts to 
uphold agreements and promises that are within established and accepted 
parameters.105 
In the case of a marriage contract or family dispute, arbitration may 
entail agreeing for a local committee of religious leaders to rule on the 
division of property following a divorce; or, in the case of a business 
transaction, it might be deciding that a private arbitration organization or 
industry association rules on any disagreements.106  The point is that the 
arbitration body—regardless of whether it is a Rabbinical court, an Islamic 
 
Arbitration Awards, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 730, 764 (1996) (discussing the various non-statutory grounds 
under which vacatur is granted); see also Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in 
American Courts, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 431, 435–36 (2014). 
 100.  One argument is that women will be forced to submit to arbitration, but this risk is there 
whether it be religious or non-religious arbitration or even judicial proceedings.  See Daly, supra 
note 92, at 15; Volokh, supra note 99, at 453.  
 101.  Not responding may mean that a judgment or decision may be made without your 
participation. 
 102.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”). 
 103.  Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration, 37 Vt. L. 
Rev. 157, 162 (2012).   
 104.  See, e.g., Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of 
Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 
437–40 (2006); see also Helfand, supra note 96 at 1232–40. 
 105.  See Baker, supra note 103, at 162. 
 106.  It should be noted that  many parties may not even be able to agree on the arbitrator, 
rendering this whole issue moot. 
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tribunal, or a secular body—derives its authority from the consent of the 
parties requesting arbitration within the confines of established laws, 
procedures, and public policy.107  The fact that the parties are choosing to 
settle their disagreements by reference to their understanding of Islamic law 
is therefore of no more consequence to society than if they decided to settle 
the same dispute by tossing a coin, asking a neighbor to decide, or any of the 
other ways in which human beings settle disagreements peacefully.108 
In the matrimonial context, anti-Sharī’ah advocates have pointed to a 
number of cases to evince the threat posed by Muslims.  One such case is 
Odatalla v. Odatalla, where the wife appealed to the courts to enforce the 
mahr provision of her Islamic prenuptial agreement or marriage contract.109  
The court held that “all of the essential elements of a contract [were] 
present” and ordered the husband to pay $10,000 to his wife.110  The court 
noted that enforcement was “based upon ‘neutral principles of law’ and not 
on religious policy or theories.”111  Illustrative for our purposes, the judge 
wrote: “Why should a contract for the promise to pay money be less of a 
contract just because it was entered into at the time of an Islamic marriage 
ceremony? . . . .  Clearly, this court can enforce a contract which is not in 
contravention of established law or public policy.”112 
The evidence, even in the cases put forth by anti-Sharī’ah advocates, 
proves that courts make such determinations on a case-by-case basis.  In 
fact, in Zawahir v. Alwattar,113 the court applied the same contract principles 
and refused to enforce a mahr agreement because the husband only entered 
 
 107.  See Baker, supra note 103, at 165. 
 108.  Of course, this is provided that there is no question of duress, unconscionability, bias, or 
violation of public policy.  There is also a great deal of debate and discussion about privatization of 
justice and the possible dangers to the vulnerable.  See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A 
Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.573–607 
(2008).  Although there are some legitimate issues here, it must be noted that these problems are not 
limited to the religious context alone and would not justify banning religious alternative dispute 
resolution but not others.  
 109.  810 A.2d 93, 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see also Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-
Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in Women’s Rights and 
Islamic Family Law: Perspectives on Reform (Lyn Welchman, ed., 2004) (discussing whether it 
should be treated as a pre-nuptial agreement or a simple contract and citing Muslim lawyer, Abed 
Awad, who has extensive litigation in this area). 
 110.  Odatalla, 810 A.2d at 98. 
 111.  Id. at 95–96. 
 112.  Id. at 95. 
 113.  No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008). 
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into it “as a result of overreaching or coercion.”114 
In addition to cases revolving around mahr agreements, courts have also 
been called upon to determine the validity of marriages conducted in 
accordance with religious law.  In fact, in many instances Muslim couples 
perform religious ceremonies without following through with the legal 
registration.115  Courts are often asked to adjudicate the validity of such 
marriages as a precursor to determining the other rights flowing from such 
relationships.  In Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals recognized a couple’s Islamic marriage, but not their religious 
divorce.116  In Aleem v. Aleem, a Maryland court held that a talaq (Islamic 
divorce), granted in Pakistan, was unenforceable because, by being 
accessible only to men, talaq was against public policy under the Equal 
Rights Amendment of the Maryland Constitution, and it denied due process 
rights to women.117 
In the context of custody, American courts have for some time applied 
the best interest of the child test.118  This test would, presumably, apply 
regardless of whether the court was interpreting a religious or non-religious 
contract, reviewing an arbitration agreement, or enforcing a foreign 
judgment or settlement related to child custody.  The courts also have 
inherent common law parens patriae120 jurisdiction, often supplemented by 
statute, to intervene when and if necessary to ensure that the best interests of 
vulnerable children are protected in all contexts.121 
 
 114.  Id. at *6. 
 115.  See Ruqaiyyah Waris Magsood, Weddings, BBC (Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/ritesrituals/weddings_1.shtml.  
 116.  719 S.E.2d 192, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 731 S.E.2d (N.C. 2012). 
 117.  947 A.2d 489, 500–02 (Md. 2008). 
 118.  See Christian Reichel Van Deusen, The Best Interest of the Child and the Law, 18 PEPP. L. 
REV. 417, 419–20 (1991); see also Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable: The Best 
Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 
25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 450 (2005). 
 120.  See Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State’s Parens 
Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and 
Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 287–88 (1992); see also Lawrence B. Custer, The 
Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195, 195–96 (1978). 
 121.  Judith Areen, Intervention between the Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State’s Role 
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L. J. 887, 894–910 (1975) (providing a historical 
account of the parens patriae doctrine); Tanya Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out With the 
Bathwater: A Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 1, 30 (2009) (noting that a “child’s best interests provide the sole justification for state’s 
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Other cases brought up by anti-Sharī’ah activists as evidence of 
creeping Sharī’ah involve Muslim business people attempting to use Islamic 
principles in business dealings; innocuous attempts to work around interest 
prohibitions; zoning and property disputes, attempts to have judgments from 
Islamic jurisdictions enforced; and even attempts to raise defenses relying on 
interpretations of Islamic law or a certain Muslim cultural practices or 
views122  Anti-Sharī’ah advocates have pounced on situations where parties 
attempt to have American courts enforce decisions made in foreign courts.123  
In such contexts, it may be necessary for an American court to consider the 
foreign law applied to determine whether to defer to the foreign court’s 
decision.  This principle of comity, whereby courts of one nation voluntarily 
recognize the executive, legislative, and judicial acts of another, has a long 
history in America.124  Scholars disagree about whether it is a rule of 
customary international law, but the fact remains that comity plays a 
significant role in American domestic jurisprudence.125  In evaluating foreign 
law cases, American courts consider whether the foreign jurisdiction’s 
decision, judgment, order, and the legal systems practices and procedures 
 
exercise of its parens patriae authority”).  
 122.  See generally, Patel, supra note 7; CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 84. 
 123.  One of the main proponents of the anti-Sharī’ah law movement, the American Public Policy 
Alliance (APPA) notes: “These foreign laws, frequently at odds with U.S. constitutional principles 
of equal protection and due process, typically enter the American court system through: [c]omity 
(mutual respect of each country’s legal system)[;] [c]hoice of law issues[;] and [c]hoice of forum or 
venue.”  American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, (last visited Feb. 15, 
2014) [hereinafter American Laws] (emphasis omitted), 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts. 
 124.  Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 38 
(2008).  William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Courts, 1 (unpublished manuscript) 
available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/11719956/william-s-dodge-american-
society-of-international-law. 
 125.  Dodge, supra note 124, at 39.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States suggests that comity is a rule of customary international law, but some scholars argue 
that this is not in line with state practice.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE U.S. § 403 cmt. a (1987).  As the Supreme Court noted in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–
64, 167 (1895): “‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.  But it is the recognition which one nation 
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws. . . .  A judgment affecting the status of persons, 
such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country, unless 
contrary to the policy of its own law.” 
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violate federal or state public policy.126 
Anti-Sharī’ah advocates have cited a number of cases to back their 
tenuous claim that Sharī’ah is stealthily sneaking in through the doctrine of 
comity, but a close examination of the cases they have highlighted 
contradicts their claim.  In Amin v. Bakhaty, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
refused to enforce a custody order as being against public policy because 
Egyptian law did not consider the child’s best interest as “paramount.”127  In 
Aleem v. Aleem, a Maryland court refused to enforce Pakistani law 
pertaining to divorce and division of assets because Pakistani law did not 
afford the wife due process, in violation of state public policy.128  In 
Tarikonda v. Pinjari, a Michigan court denied the recognition of a divorce 
conducted according to Indian laws governing Muslim marriage because the 
wife was not afforded due process or equal protection rights, and the divorce 
thus violated state public policy.129  In contrast, in two other cases cited by 
anti-Sharī’ah advocates—Hosain v. Malik130 and Saleh v. United States 
Department of Justice131—both courts concluded that public policy and 
American due process standards were not violated.132  Even in a non-family 
 
 126.  Where foreign law conflicts with state public policy, courts refuse to recognize or apply it.  
See, e.g., Innes v. Carrascosa, 918 A.2d 686, 710 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding that, 
because child custody order issued by court of Spain “contravene[s] the public policy of this state 
that both parents should share in the custodial rights of the child absent a finding that it would not be 
in the best interest of the child, comity cannot be afforded”); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 
249 (Md. 1997) (declining to enforce British court’s libel judgment because “[t]he principles 
governing defamation actions under English law . . . are so contrary to Maryland defamation law, 
and to the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law, that [the] judgment should be 
denied recognition under principles of comity”); Al-Fassi v. Al-Fassi, 433 So.2d 664, 668 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1983) (noting, with respect to child custody order issued by Bahamian court, that “the 
principles of comity do not require recognition since the decree is offensive to a public policy of our 
state, i.e., that a custody decision be based upon the best interests and welfare of the minor 
children”). 
 127.  798 So.2d 75, 86 (La. 2001). 
 128.  947 A.2d 489, 500 (Md. 2008). 
 129.  No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007 (Mich. App. Apr. 7, 2009). 
 130.  671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (examining “whether the Pakistani courts applied a 
rule of law, evidence, or procedure so contradictory to Maryland public policy as to undermine the 
confidence in the trial”). 
 131.  962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992).   
 132.  In Hosain v. Malik, the court granted comity to a Pakistani court’s child custody order.  671 
A.2d 988, 1003 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).  The court held that Pakistan applied the best interest of 
the child test and that “[t]he evidence was overwhelming that, as a general principle, Pakistan 
follows the best interest of the child test in making child custody decisions.”  Id. at 998.  In Saleh v. 
United States Department of Justice, 962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992), a federal court refused to reverse 
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case, Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp.,133 an American court determined that a 
Saudi Arabian court would not be an adequate alternative forum for a female 
plaintiff to pursue her claims for a diving injury because of “biases against 
women and non-Muslims [and] . . . systemic prejudices.”134 
Far from supporting the position advanced by anti-Sharī’ah activists, 
these cases reveal that courts have granted comity only when doing so would 
not violate public policy or cherished American due process rights.  Indeed, 
even one of the main proponents of the anti-Sharī’ah law movement, the 
American Public Policy Alliance (“APPA”), acknowledges that: 
Granting comity to a foreign judgment is a matter of state law, and 
most state and federal courts will grant comity unless the 
recognition of the foreign judgment would violate some important 
public policy of the state. This doctrine, the “Void as against Public 
Policy Rule,” has a long and pedigreed history.135 
The last types of cases that anti-Sharī’ah advocates have attacked 
involve those where criminal defendants use their religious beliefs as a 
defense to vitiate their culpability.136  Again, this is not new or restricted to 
Muslims.137  There is a growing body of scholarship exploring this issue as 
part of individuals’ due process rights to assert their lack of intent.138  Again, 
 
a deportation order for a Yemeni man released from state prison after serving a sentence for 
murdering a fellow Yemeni.  Id. at 240.  The man claimed that he would be persecuted upon his 
return to Yemen because a Yemeni Islamic court had sentenced him to death for the murder.  Id. at 
237–38.  After examining Yemeni law, the appeals court rejected the defense, holding that “the 
nondiscriminatory application of Yemeni criminal law to his intentional killing of a fellow Yemeni 
Moslem” and  “imposing a punishment that would be inflicted in many secular jurisdictions” did not 
amount to persecution.  Id. at 237, 239. 
 133.  No. CIV.A. 97-4530-B, 1999 WL 26874, at *1, *3 (Mass. Super. 1999). 
 134.  Id.at *3. 
 135.  American Laws, supra note 123 (emphasis omitted). 
 136.  See, e.g., Ave Mince-Didier, Cultural and Religious Defenses to Criminal Charges, 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER.COM (2014), 
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/cultural-and-religious-defenses-criminal-
charges.htm. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See generally, Kent Greenawalt, The Cultural Defense: Reflections in Light of the Model 
Penal Code and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 299 (2009); Alison 
Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense: Challenging the Monocultural Paradigm, CULTURAL 
DEFENSE (Aug. 7, 2009), available at  http://www.unipa.it/dottoratodirittiumani/seminari_dottorato_ 
archivio_2010/maggio_10/Renteln_Bruylant.pdf. 
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courts have not rejected these arguments outright, but they have measured 
them against American public policy.139  Anti-Sharī’ah activists went as far 
back as 1976 to find the case of People v. Benu, where a Muslim man was 
charged with child endangerment for arranging the marriage of his underage 
daughter.140  The court rejected his “Islamic” argument and found him guilty, 
just as courts have done in religious defenses raised by Christians.141  
Despite the fact that it is not an exclusively Muslim issue and that it is far 
more nuanced and complex then they have made it out to be, anti-Sharī’ah 
activists were able to latch onto one trial judge’s ruling in New Jersey 
(which was correctly overturned by a New Jersey court of appeals) to prove 
that Sharī’ah was taking over America.142  As Abed Awad writes: 
The Sharia scaremongers often rely on a single New Jersey case, 
S.D. v. M.J.R., as proof that Islamic law is seeping into our court 
system.  In it, a wife sought a restraining order against her husband, 
alleging that he repeatedly beat and sexually assaulted her.  The 
judge denied her request, holding that the defendant did not form 
the criminal intent necessary to commit the crime, because his 
genuine religious beliefs dictated that he was entitled to sexual 
relations upon demand.  The ruling was wrong—both under state 
law and Sharia—and, not surprisingly, the New Jersey Appellate 
Court reversed it in 2010.143 
III.  MULTICULTURALISM AND LEGAL PLURALISM 
Effective governance in contemporary liberal societies requires 
balancing individuals’ religious commitments and convictions with the 
state’s need to maintain general rules and standards applicable to all.  While 
these debates implicate a wide range of very broad philosophical, social and 
 
 139.  See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 140.  87 Misc. 2d 139, 140 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976). 
 141.  In the case of Scott Roeder, convicted for murdering abortion provider Dr. George Tiller, the 
court rejected his argument that his religious beliefs about abortion being murder should mitigate his 
culpability.  See Robin Abcarian, Scott Roeder Convicted of Murdering Abortion Doctor George 
Tiller, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/29/nation/la-na-tiller-trial30-
2010jan29.  Criminal defendants in polygamy cases who put forth religious arguments to vitiate their 
intent where are also found guilty.  See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946). 
 142.  S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2010). 
 143.  Awad, supra note 6. 
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constitutional considerations, another recurring theme is the unique 
challenge of reconciling conflicts not just between religion and law, but 
between “religious legal communities” and the law of the nation-state.144  
American Muslim and Jewish communities serve as prime examples of such 
religious legal communities—that is, communities that experience some of 
their religious norms through the prism of “legal” rules—and thus the 
challenges faced by these communities often parallel each other in important 
ways.145   What is worthy of note here is that the focus has been on trying to 
deny Muslims an equal seat in the dockets.146 
A popular war cry of anti- Sharī’ah advocates in a number of western 
jurisdictions has been “one law for all”147 and in the American context, this 
has morphed into “American Law for American Courts.”148  These rallying 
cries are, at worst, disingenuous and, at best, inaccurate because these 
jurisdictions permit parties a variety of routes, options, and choices in 
resolving their legal issues within a legal framework and, in many cases, 
even allow parties to opt out of statutory regimes.149  In addition to the 
foregoing, in the United States there is diversity between states and between 
 
 144.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 145.  Muhammed Elsayed, Contracting Into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia Enactments and the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 937, 937–38 (2013). 
 146.  See infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. 
 147.  See, e.g., One Law For All—Against Sharia Law in Britain, ONE LAW FOR ALL: NO SHARIA 
CAMPAIGN (Aug. 2008), http://onelawforallpetition.com/onelaw/onela300.php?nr=40155035; 
http://www.onelawforall.org.uk/; see also Harvey Simmons, One Law for All Ontarians, STAR (Sept. 
14, 2010), http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2010/09/14/one_law_for_all_ 
ontarians.html. 
 148.  American Laws, supra note 123.  This of course shifted after their defeat in Oklahoma when 
Islamic law was specifically targeted.  See, e.g., American Law, supra note 123. 
 149.  As Natasha Bakht, who wrote a report that various women’s groups used in opposing faith-
based arbitration in Ontario, points out in a reconsidered article published after the controversy:  
In fact, it is disingenuous to speak of “one law for all” when Ontario’s family law permits 
parties to opt out of the default statutory regime such as the equal division of matrimonial 
property.  Parties can, through negotiation, mediation or arbitration, based on the right to 
contract freely, agree to almost any resolution of their marital affairs . . . .  [C]ouples’ 
decisions to settle their family law affairs are generally left un-reviewed by the courts. 
See Natasha Bakht, Were Muslim Barbarians Really Knocking on the Gates of Ontario?: The 
Religious Arbitration Controversy—Another Perspective, OTTAWA L. REV. 67, 67–82 (2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121790.  Indeed, if the right 
existed for people to opt out of the existing family law regime, why should religious people be 
prevented from structuring settlements consistent with their values and beliefs, again subject to the 
usual contractual and common law protections and mechanisms for review? 
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states and the federal realm.150  Moreover, these simplistic slogans deny the 
reality on the ground in terms of the prevailing multiculturalism, legal 
pluralism, choices and options to opt out.   
The foreign law and Sharī’ah law ban controversy is a compelling case 
study in multiculturalism151 and legal pluralism.152  A multicultural society 
inherently accepts the idea that the various subgroups within society will 
celebrate their differences in all areas including the legal arena.  Indeed, this 
is the essence of multicultural citizenship and stands in stark contrast to the 
cultural assimilation traditionally demanded of migrants and minorities.153  
Many nations around the world have officially adopted multiculturalism 
though the United States has not officially done so.154  Nevertheless, a strong 
argument can be made that multiculturalism is the most accurate 
characterization of the ethnic interrelationships and diversity in the United 
States.155 
The nature and limits of multicultural and multi-religious 
accommodation within liberal democracies has been the subject of 
considerable scholarship over the last few decades.156  The primary focus of 
pioneering theorists such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka has been the 
legal accommodation claims of minorities.157  Much of this discussion has 
centered on issues of internal self-governance and legal pluralism.158  Indeed, 
as Jeff Spinner-Halev and Jacob Levy argue, if liberty is to be meaningful, 
 
 150.  See supra Part II and accompanying text. 
 151.  Multiculturalism is essentially the idea that a diversity of cultures can coexist within a single 
national state.  See generally CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM (1994); TARIQ 
MODOOD, MULTICULTURALISM (2d ed. 2007); Faisal Bhabha, Between Exclusion and Assimilation: 
Experimentalizing Multiculturalism, 54 MCGILL L.J. 45, 51 (2009). 
 152.  Legal pluralism is the notion that individuals and groups are bound by and respect a plurality 
of legal orders within that state.  John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 
& UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 38 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 
(1988). 
 153.  JOSEPH F. HEALEY, RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, AND CLASS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF GROUP 
CONFLICT AND CHANGE 45 (6th ed. 2012). 
 154.  Bhabha, supra note 149, at 51. 
 155.  John A. Garcia, A Multicultural America: Living in a Sea of Diversity, in 
MULTICULTURALISM FROM THE MARGINS 29, 29–38 (Dean A. Harris ed. Bergin & Garvey 1995). 
 156.  WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); RICHARD A. SHWEDER 
ET AL., ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACIES (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2002). 
 157.  KYMLICKA, supra note 154; TAYLOR, supra note 149. 
 158.  See Griffiths, supra note 150; Merry, supra note 150. 
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the liberal state must protect the freedom of religious communities to govern 
their lives according to their deeply-held views.159 
Over time, scholars have begun to realize that while a state may impose 
its own law, various other legal systems continue to exist and compete with 
the state law system.160  In essence, contrary to conventional wisdom, legal 
pluralism, not legal centrism is the norm.161  As with any controversial term, 
definitions of legal pluralism are abound.  John Griffiths, one of the key 
developers of the theory, defines a situation of legal pluralism as: 
[O]ne in which law and legal institutions are not all subsumable 
within one “system” but have their sources in the self-regulatory 
activities . . . which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate 
one another, so that the “law” which is actually effective on the 
“ground floor” of society is the result of enormously complex and 
usually in practice unpredictable patterns of competition, 
interaction, negotiation, isolationism, and the like.162 
This contrasts sharply with legal centralism, which assumes that the 
state is the only source of law.163  Many involved in the Sharī’ah law debate 
uncritically accept (or pretend to accept) the assumption of exclusive state 
control over law inherent to the notion of legal centralism.164  In reality, legal 
pluralism is predominant in virtually all societies.165   
The most widely used conception of plural legal systems is Sally Falk 
Moore’s notion of the semi-autonomous social field.166  These semi-
autonomous social fields each have rule-making powers and people abide by 
these rules in contexts ranging from classrooms to sports fields to places of 
worship.167 
 
 159.  MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY 11 (Avigail Eisenberg 
& Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005). 
 160.  See Griffiths, supra note 150, at 38–39; Merry, supra note 150, at 870–71; Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 
375, 375 (2008). 
 161.  See Merry, supra note 150, at 869. 
 162.  Griffiths, supra note 150, at 39. 
 163.  Id. at 3. 
 164.  See Patel, supra note 16, at 1–2, 2 n.9. 
 165.  Merry, supra note 150, at 869. 
 166.  See generally Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social 
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973). 
 167.  Id. at 721.  For instance boxers can get in the ring and as long as they comply with boxing 
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The evolutionary nature of Islamic law168 and the multicultural and 
pluralistic nature of American society provide an opportunity to 
acknowledge and accept this reality, and to devise a practical model of legal 
pluralism that can facilitate a harmonious relationship between Islamic law 
and various state and federal laws and systems.169  Indeed, as Moore points 
out, the different legal orders exist in relation to each other and, hence, affect 
the way that each is able to operate.170  There is a range of possible 
relationships that can be devised between Islamic law and state law.171 
Miranda Forsyth, for instance, details a typology of seven potential 
models of “how to ‘do’ legal pluralism.”172  They range from informal to 
formal, and include: (1) “[r]epression of non-state justice system by the state 
justice system;” (2) “[f]ormal independence between the systems but tacit 
acceptance by the state of the non-state justice system;” (3) “[n]o formal 
recognition but active encouragement of non-state justice system by the 
state;” (4) “[l]imited formal recognition by the state of the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a non-state justice system”; (5) “formal recognition of 
exclusive jurisdiction in a defined area;” (6) “state recogni[tion of] the right 
of non-state justice system to exercise jurisdiction and lend its coercive 
powers”; and (7) “complete incorporation of the non-state justice system by 
the state.”173  The level of formality and self-governance will determine what 
will be acceptable to each of the perspectives—society as a whole, the state, 
and the respective communities whose norms and scope of self-governance 
is under negotiation or discussion.174 
American policy makers and legislators have much to play with if they 
are truly concerned about crafting a workable and constitutionally sound 
arrangement to allow religious law and state law to co-exist in their own 
social fields.175  In fact, various states and stakeholders have been 
 
regulations (their internal community “law”) the state does not charge a boxer with assault unless the 
boxing rules or regulations were broken.  How come religious communities are not, for the most 
part, granted such autonomy and, if they are, then why do activists have issues with this? 
 168.  Quraishi-Landes, supra, note 74, at 5. 
 169.  See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 170.  Moore, supra 164, at 723. 
 171.  See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 172.  Miranda Forsyth, How to “Do” Legal Pluralism, in LEGAL PLURALISM: CONCEPTS AND 
CRITIQUES 1 (Naresh Kumar ed., 2009). 
 173.  Id. at 5–8. 
 174.  Id. at 8–9. 
 175.  See id. at 5–8. 
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implementing such arrangements for some time.176  In essence, they have 
been “doing” legal pluralism.177  Fearing the Sharī’ah bogeyman, some 
states have tried to implement the first model from Forsyth’s typology, the 
result of which, as we saw in Oklahoma, was found unconstitutional.178  This 
model, of course, will not address any of the legitimate concerns raised by 
some anti-Sharī’ah advocates, nor will it respect the rights of those who 
wish to live their vision of the good life in accordance with their core beliefs, 
as promised to them by the project of liberal democracy.179 
I would concur with Chandran Kukathas and Jeff Spinner-Halev that the 
state, in a multicultural citizenship model, should grant greater self-
governance powers, particularly over issues central to cultural identity and 
preservation.180  This would be consistent with the reality of legal pluralism 
that is evident on the ground.181  The state should only intervene when a 
community harms its members (or a segment thereof) or the outside 
community or when procedural and constitutional norms are violated.182  
Such an intervention would only be possible and effective if there was 
formal institutionalization of the practice and interaction between the state 
and non-state systems.183 
A more robust multicultural model-taking cognizance of the reality of 
legal pluralism would have also facilitated the indigenization process of 
Islamic law.184  Such an indigenization would be in line with the essence of 
multiculturalism and legal pluralism.185  Moreover, this would have been one 
of the best ways to ensure that the minority community evolves itself using 
its own internal mechanisms and through respectful engagement and 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117–18 (10th Cir. 2012) (exemplifying 
Oklahoma’s attempt to implement Forsyth’s first model of typology). 
  177.    See id. 
  178.    Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129–33. 
 179.  Forsyth, supra note 170 at 5. 
 180.  MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 157, at 10–11. 
 181.  See Bhabha, supra note 149, at 48–49. 
 182.  Cf. Minorities Within Minorities, supra note 157, at 10–11 (arguing for even less state 
intervention in communities). 
 183.  Cf. Forsyth, supra note 170, at 11–12 (describing possible ways the state and communities’ 
systems can better interact and coexist). 
 184.  Cf. Kutty, supra note 20, at 594 (discussing the indigenization process of Islamic law in 
Canada).  
 185.  See id. at 595. 
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interaction with the mainstream community.186  This would be consistent 
with Miranda Forsyth’s notion of “planned legal pluralism,” which would 
“ensure that the various legal systems in a particular jurisdiction operate in 
ways that support and enrich each other, rather than undermine and compete 
with each other.”187  This is not a farfetched theoretical dream because the 
evolutionary and context-specific nature of Islamic law makes it conducive 
to the dialectical model within the broader state legal system.188 
As scholars have documented, it is impossible to suppress these semi-
autonomous social fields entirely within a society.189  This Sharī’ah ban 
controversy provides a timely opportunity to develop and experiment with 
models of legal pluralism that can balance the competing rights in a manner 
that attempts to respect all parties and protect the vulnerable.190  It is also a 
great occasion to explore how Islamic law and liberal democracy can coexist 
and complement each other. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The number of religion and state issues brought before the Supreme 
Court in recent years underscores an incontrovertible truth in the American 
legal system: the relationship between the state and religion in this country is 
still fluid and changing.191  To put a twist on a well-known saying from 
Mohandas K. Gandhi, those who thought that religion could be separate and 
distinct from law understand neither religion nor law.  As outrageous as it 
may appear to anti-Sharī’ah advocates, if constitutional rights to religious 
freedom, equal treatment, and freedom of contract are to have any real value, 
religious communities, including Muslims, must be guaranteed access to 
justice both in United States courts and outside of the court system.  It would 
be odd and un-American to insist that Muslims must always couch their 
claims in non-religious terms to obtain justice while others need not do so. 
The idea that people entering freely into a contract have the right to 
agree as to how they settle any disagreements within the confines of state 
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law is relatively uncontroversial (provided the normal contractual and legal 
protections are in place) outside this anti-Sharī’ah group.192  Consenting and 
informed adults must be able to make religious choices even if others do not 
believe these are “correct” choices.  As Ronald Dworkin says about faith 
(albeit not in the context of this controversy): 
We can’t ask people to set aside their most profound convictions 
about the truth of deep moral and ethical issues when we are also 
asking them to make decisions . . . that are for most people the most 
basic and fundamental moral and ethical decisions they will in their 
lifetime be called upon to make.193 
Scholars have advanced various arguments as to why the Establishment 
Clause instructs courts not to interfere in cases implicating religious 
doctrines or practice.  These reasons have ranged from adjudicative 
disability (state has limited competence)194 to ensuring that the government 
does not favor any one religion or any particular minority or majority view 
within a religion.195  These are all legitimate considerations but these 
difficulties and complexities do not justify court’s total or complete 
prohibition from entertaining religious issues.  Moreover, from a religious 
freedom and equal treatment perspective, it would be unfair to prevent 
Muslims from resorting to courts to have their religious disputes resolved 
when this right is available to others.  Additionally, from the perspective of 
access to justice, as made evident from the plight of the two women from 
our introduction, Elahm Soleimani and Rima Nahavandi, in some cases 
justice is being denied to deserving Americans simply for the sake of 
preserving theoretical purity.  Michael Helfand makes a strong case for 
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allowing the litigation of certain religious cases (that have traditionally not 
been entertained) through the courts when no other forum is available.196  He 
points out: 
Indeed, the prohibition against litigating religion in judicial forums 
has come at a serious cost.  As a number of courts have noted, 
dismissing a case as non-justiciable under the Establishment Clause 
“imposes a harsh consequence on a plaintiff” and “is a drastic 
measure, because when a case is nonjusticiable it means the wrong 
committed, if there is one, cannot be remedied anywhere.”197 
As discussed above and as noted by anti-Sharī’ah advocates, there are 
cases where Muslims have sought, directly or indirectly, to use Islamic 
principles in resolving aspects of their disputes—as is their right.198  This is 
nothing unique to Muslims; people of other faiths have regularly exercised 
the same right.199  These cases provide evidence of nothing more than the 
fact that, just like non-Muslims, some Muslims may wish to settle their 
disputes in accordance with the principles of their faith, and courts will 
oblige this desire  within the confines of American constitutional law and 
judicial practice and precedent.  The courts have also rejected such claims—
sometimes for valid reasons, and other times for reasons that we may need to 
question in a multi-religious legal pluralistic liberal democracy. 
The evidence is clear that courts treat claims by Muslims using religious 
law the same way they deal with claims brought by those of other faiths and 
those of no faith—sometimes they are accepted and sometimes they are 
rejected.200  The nuanced, case-by-case approach that has evolved in the 
courts, acting through the prism of established Establishment Clause and 
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Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, principles of comity, contract law, and 
public policy, provides sufficient checks to ensure that courts do not become 
impermissibly entangled with religion and do not allow for Islamic law, or 
any religious or foreign law for that matter, to become the law of the land.  
Indeed, as Matthew Franck, a noted legal analyst at the Conservative 
National Review, concluded after reviewing the cases identified as 
transforming American legal culture: 
Thirty-five years’ worth of American law, and we have a whopping 
seven cases in which some “foreign law” was honored (not even 
Sharia in every case), and not enough information even to tell if 
something truly unjust happened in any of the seven.  In the other 
thirteen cases, Sharia-law principles were rejected either at trial or 
on appeal.201 
While his use of the term “Sharia” can be quibbled with, for our 
purposes, suffice it to reinforce this paper’s position that far from evidencing 
creeping Sharī’ah or a surrender to judicial Jihad, the cases he addresses and 
those touched upon in this paper only confirm that the American 
Constitution and legal principles stand firm and pre-eminent; Muslims 
merely have had access to the dockets, nothing more and nothing less. 
 
 
 201.  Matthew Franck, A Solution in Search of a Problem, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 15, 2012, 
5:10 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/303028/solution-search-problem-matthew-
j-franck.  The ACLU comes to the same conclusion.  PROGRAM ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND 
BELIEF: ACLU, NOTHING TO FEAR: DEBUNKING THE MYTHICAL “SHARIA THREAT” TO OUR 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 5 (2011) available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_Report_ 
FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf (“Far from confirming some fabricated conspiracy, these cases illustrate 
that our judicial system is alive and well, and in no danger of being co-opted or taken over by 
Islam.”). 
